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NATURE OF THE CASE 
On November 1, 1974, Plaintiff-Appellant (hereinafter 
"Plaintiff") sued the Defendants-Respondents (hereinafter 
"Defendants") as a partnership doing business as "The Exchange," 
for the reasonable value of materials furnished and labor 
performed upon real property leased by The Exchange. The 
Complaint stated two claims for relief, one pursuant to 
Section 14-2-1, Utah Code Ann. (1953) and the other in 
quantum meruit. 
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Defendants moved for dismissal of the action on the 
grounds that Plaintiff had sued the wrong parties, said 
motion being verified (R. 4) and based, in substance, upon 
the following grounds: 
1. That the three individuals named as defendants were 
not, nor had they ever been a partnership, a joint venture 
or a dba; 
2. That they had never done business as The Exchange; 
3. That The Exchange was the dba of The Exchange Place 
Social Association, a Utah non-profit corporation; and 
4. That the Defendants individually had never con-
tracted with plaintiff or with anyone. 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
The District Court of the Third Judicial District in 
and for Salt Lake County, State of Utah, Judge Stewart M. 
Hanson, Jr., presiding, heard Defendants' motion to dismiss 
on January 21, 1975, and, after receiving additional exhibits, 
evidence and argument, determined that the three individual 
defendants named in Plaintiff's Complaint were not in fact a 
partnership or joint venture nor were they nor had they ever 
been doing business as "The Exchange11 and therefore, dis-
missed Plaintiff's Complaint as to those defendants. In 
dismissing said Complaint, Judge Hanson granted Plaintiff 
ten days in which to refile its action against the proper 
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party, The Exchange Place Social Association, a Utah non-
profit corporation. 
On or about the 29th day of January, 1975, Plaintiff 
made a Motion to Reconsider. The motion was heard by Judge 
Hanson on February 11, 1975, and additional argument and 
evidence were presented after which Plaintiff's Motion to 
Reconsider was denied. 
From that order of dismissal in favor of Defendants, 
Plaintiff has appealed. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Defendants seek affirmance of the lower court's ruling 
dismissing Plaintiff's Complaint and for their costs of this 
appeal. In the alternative, should the Court decide in 
favor of Plaintiff upon this appeal, Defendants seek an 
order staying any award of costs in this matter, costs of 
appeal to be awarded to that party ultimately prevailing 
upon final disposition of this case. 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
Defendants basically agree with the "Statement of the 
Facts" as set out by Plaintiff in its brief with the few 
exceptions and additions as set out hereinbelow. In stating 
this agreement, Defendants do wish to draw the Court's 
attention to the fact that, in presenting the facts in its 
brief, Plaintiff has for the most part (as Plaintiff itself 
-3-Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
indicates throughout its Statement of Facts) set out only 
what was alleged in the Complaint and various other documents 
on their face and not what the facts actually are or what 
the facts have been determined to be. 
Defendants1 sole exception to Plaintiff's Statement of 
the Facts as set out in Plaintiff's brief is the language 
referring to two architects (Dan Losee and Raymond Jones) 
alleged by Plaintiff to have been "employed by Stanley 
Adams." Defendants take exception to this language only 
insofar as it may indicate or infer some employment of said 
architects by Mr. Adams in his individual capacity. At no 
time relevant to this case was Mr. Adams or any of the other 
defendants named herein acting in their individual capacities. 
Defendants wish also to add the following clarifica-
tions with respect to the Certificates of Doing Business 
Under an Assumed Name (hereinafter "dba") filed May 9, 
1973, (R. 36-37) and December 7, 1974, (R. 34-35) as re-
ferred to in Plaintiff's brief, which facts were also pre-
sented to the court below: 
1. The Articles of Incorporation of The Exchange Place 
Social Association, a non-profit Utah corporation, were 
filed May 4, 1973, (R.29) and contained the following pro-
vision as Article I thereof: 
The name of this corporation is 
The Exchange Place Social Association. 
-4-
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(This corporation will also be known 
as (aka) and do business as (dba) The 
Exchange.) 
2. The Secretary of State's office, upon approving 
said articles, telephoned the corporation's agent and trustee, 
Stanley S. Adams, and informed him that a formal Certificate 
of Doing Business Under an Assumed Name ("dba") form needed 
to be filed pursuant to the terms of Article I of the Articles 
of Incorporation (as set out fully above). 
3. Pursuant to said request, and approximately five 
days after filing the said Articles of Incorporation, Mr. 
Adams filed said "dba" under the mistaken impression that 
the Secretary of State instructed that he list the actual 
names of the trustees of the corporation rather than simply 
the corporate name itself, which corporation was in fact 
doing business as The Exchange. Mr. Adams filed and signed 
this "dba" as trustee for the corporation. (See R. 36-37) 
4. At no time were Stanley S. Adams, Von H. Whitby or 
Tony M. Wand doing business as The Exchange nor did they at 
any time hold themselves out to be doing so. 
5. On or about December 7, 1974, after discovery of 
the mistaken and improper listing of the trustees' names 
upon the "dba" form, a corrected "dba" form, properly list-
ing The Exchange Place Social Association as the principal 
doing business as The Exchange, was filed (R. 34-35) and the 
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mistaken "dba" was withdrawn. 
Further, Plaintiff and its President, Ben Holbrook, had 
for several years done business with Defendant Stanley S. 
Adams and had done substantial work on another private club, 
The Winery, in connection with which Mr. Adams had (and 
still does) serve as trustee. Mr. Holbrook knew, at all 
times relevant herein and before, the corporate form and 
existence of said club and that the same was required by 
law. This fact was also brought to the attention of the 
trial court. 
ARGUMENT * 
1
 POINT I 
THE LOWER COURT WAS CORRECT IN MAKING ITS
 : 
RULING THAT THE INDIVIDUALS NAMED AS DEFENDANTS 
WERE NOT PROPER PARTIES AND IN DISMISSING PLAIN-
TIFF'S COMPLAINT ACCORDINGLY. 
At the outset Defendants wish to bring the Court's 
attention to the fact that Plaintiff has, with the sole 
exception of parts of Point III in its brief, not addressed 
itself to the sole issue of its own appeal. That sole issue 
is whether or not the Defendants "Stanley S. Adams, Von H. 
Whitby and Tony M. Wand" are proper defendants as named by 
Plaintiff in its Complaint. It is solely upon this issue 
which the lower court ruled and not as to the sufficiency of 
the allegations upon the two causes of action of the Com-
plaint as is addressed by Plaintiff in its brief. For this 
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reason, and for purposes of organization in stating their 
position and replying to Plaintiff's brief, Defendants will 
address each formal "Point" as contained in Plaintiff's 
brief. 
(A) REPLY TO POINT I: 
Plaintiff spends its entire time and argument in Point 
I attempting to pursuade the court that Plaintiff has on its 
face set out a short and plain statement of the elements of 
two separate causes of action ("a claim either under Section 
14-2-1, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, [sic] or in quantum 
meruit." See Plaintiff's brief, Page 5). 
While Defendants may agree that these allegations on 
their face allege causes of action in general (that is, 
that these allegations allege the prima facie elements of 
quantum meruit or Section 14-2-1 liability), the sufficiency 
of those allegations is not at issue on this appeal. It is 
whether those causes of action are properly claimed against 
the named Defendants which is at issue. 
The trial court determined, upon the pleadings, evidence, 
exhibits and arguments that there was no question that the 
Complaint failed to show any claim against the named Defend-
ants, Stanley S. Adams, Von H. Whitby and Tony M. Wand, 
regardless of the sufficiency of the claims themselves in 
general. Plaintiff does not even address itself to this 
-7-
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issue in Point I of its brief. Point I therefore need not 
and should not be considered by the court in its ruling. 
(B) REPLY TO POINT II: 
Most of Plaintiff's argument in Point II consists of 
distinguishing between dismissing "for failure to state a 
claim under Rule 12(b)(6)" and "for summary judgment under 
Rule 12(b)(6) and Rule 56." Presumably this is done in 
order that Plaintiff may "set up strawmen" to be knocked 
down later in Plaintiff's Point III. The fact is that in 
neither case is Plaintiff entitled to any relief upon this 
appeal. 
While the District Court, upon all the evidence, could 
have properly found under Rule 12(b)(6) that Plaintiff's 
Complaint failed to state a claim against these defendants, 
nevertheless Defendants would agree with Plaintiff's alle-
gation that, due to the acceptance of evidence and exhibits 
outside of the pleadings themselves, the lower court's 
ruling was technically one treating and granting Defendants' 
motion as a Motion for Summary Judgment. 
In light of this agreement by both parties that the 
motion was treated as one for summary judgment, Defendants 
will next respond to Point III of Plaintiff's brief which is 
the sole attempt by Plaintiff to address itself to the 
actual issue of parties, which issue is the sole question 
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and reason for this appeal, 
(C) REPLY TO POINT III: 
The thrust of Plaintiff's argument in Point III of its 
brief is that the court could not have granted summary judg-
ment in favor of these defendants in this case because there 
existed genuine issues of material facts. With this conten-
tion Defendants (and the court below) disagree. 
Plaintiff sets out in Point III four issues which it 
believes show the existence of material facts sufficient to 
prevent, as a matter of law, the lower court from having 
granted a summary judgment. In fact these "issues" do not 
exist as determined by the lower court on all of the evi-
dence submitted. Separate treatment of each issue here does 
indicate a basis upon which Judge Hanson could have ruled 
(and presumably did rule), determining upon the evidence 
before him that these Defendants did not act in an individ-
ual capacity and that, upon this sole question, no material 
issue genuinely existed. This fact in and of itself is 
sufficient to find in Defendants' favor upon this appeal 
under the well recognized and very basic legal principle 
long accepted and followed by the Utah Supreme Court that 
where orders appealed from are within the trial court's 
jurisdiction and discretion, they can be attacked only upon 
a showing that they were not supported by any proof or any 
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construction of the evidence below. (See: Culver v. Culver, 
150 P.2d 292, 65 CA.2d 145, and Botkin v. Silveria, 49 
Cal.2d 1, 120 P.2d 910, 1916-1917 (1942), specifically 
approved by the Utah Supreme Court in Papanikolas Bros, v. 
Surgar House Shopping Center, Utah Case No. 13821, May 27, 
1975.) 
The four purported "issues" raised by Plaintiff, to-
gether with a discussion of each one, follow: 
1. Whether Plaintiff contracted with De-
fendants, or any of them, or the agent of any 
of them, prior to incorporation by the Defendants 
of The Exchange Place Social Association. 
[Plaintiff's brief, page 12] 
This first issue as stated by Plaintiff has no relevance 
to the question of parties insofar as whether or not any 
contract was made. Rather, the only basis upon which this 
issue effects the Court's judgment is as to the capacity of 
these Defendants in making any alleged contract. More 
specifically and importantly, the capacity of Defendant 
Stanley S. Adams is the only capacity pled or at issue here. 
If the lower court determined that Defendant Stanley S. 
Adams was acting in other than an individual capacity and 
that, upon the evidence there existed no material question 
as to this fact, then Plaintiff is not entitled to any 
relief from the lower court's ruling on the basis of this 
purported issue. 
The court in fact had more than ample evidence before 
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it upon which to rule that Defendant Adams was not acting in 
an individual capacity in any alleged contracts with Plain-
tiffs. Among other evidence, the lower court had the fol-
lowing before it: 
1. The affidavit of Defendants (R. 4-6) which clearly 
showed no partnership, joint venture or other operation by 
these defendants as The Exchange. 
2. The affidavit of Plaintiff's President, Ben Holbrook, 
(R. 12-13) which in fact no way contradicted the allegations 
of Defendants1 affidavit showing no individual capacity. 
3. The lower court was further apprised of the fact, 
in argument by counsel, that Defendant Stanley S. Adams was 
at all times relevant to Plaintiff's Complaint, President of 
Investestate, a Utah corporation, from which the premises in 
question were leased by The Exchange. 
4. While Plaintiff's counsel attempted to use the 
"dba" filed upon May 9, 1973, as "proof" that the three 
Defendants were operating in an individual capacity, the 
court correctly observed that said dba was not even in 
existence for over two months after the alleged contracts 
were made and that, therefore, it was of no relevance nor 
could Plaintiff have relied thereon. Further, the court 
also correctly noted that this dba dated May 9 was filed 
five days after the Articles of Incorporation of The Exchange 
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Place Social Association which clearly set out the fact that 
The Exchange was a dba of this corporation. 
5. An additional point was argued to and accepted by 
the lower court with respect to the dba form dated May 9 
which mistakenly named the three individual trustees. Not 
only was evidence submitted to the court indicating that the 
three trustees named were mistakenly listed in place of the 
corporation, but the Plaintiff itself recognized that the 
dba was signed by Mr. Adams "as trustee" and not as an 
individual, thereby adding further support to the fact that 
the individual names of the trustees were listed simply by 
mistake as a result of a misunderstood communication and 
directive from the Secretary of State. (See R. 37 and 
Plaintiff's brief, bottom of page 3) 
6. Additional evidence was presented at the hearing to 
show that Plaintiff and its president had worked on another 
private club owned and operated in exactly the same fashion 
and by the same parties and that Plaintiff knew of the 
corporate existence of this club and that the law required 
such private clubs to be corporations. 
Upon the above evidence alone the lower court could 
clearly have found that no material issue existed upon this 
purported issue and the court in fact so ruled. 
2. Whether the Defendants, or any of them, 
did business as The Exchange prior to the aforesaid 
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date of incorporation, and at the time the 
contract was entered into. [Plaintiff's 
brief, page 13] 
Plaintiff's brief bases its argument here entirely upon 
the fact that there was a dba on file on May 9, 1913, stating 
that the three individuals were doing business as The Exchange. 
Plaintiff does not, however, apprise the court of the other 
evidence presented at the hearing which caused the lower 
court to clearly rule in favor of Defendants upon this issue 
and to find that there in fact existed no material issue as 
to this question. 
This evidence was discussed in Paragraphs 5 and 6 under 
issue No. 1 above and, in order to avoid repetition, Defend-
ants will not reprint that evidence here except by way of 
summary. 
The lower court found that said dba dated May 9 was 
filed pursuant to a directive by the Secretary of State and 
that the names of the individual trustees were placed upon 
said form by mistake in place of the name of The Exchange 
Place Social Association. The Court found that the Articles 
of Incorporation, filed five days earlier, clearly set out 
the corporate existence and operation of The Exchange. The 
Court further found no reliance upon this dba in any event 
due to the fact that Plaintiff's contracts were made and 
performed in January and February of 1973 — over three 
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months earlier. In addition, the incorrect dba filed was 
signed by Mr. Adams in his capacity as "trustee." This, 
when added together with all of the other evidence submitted 
at the hearing, would clearly have allowed the lower court 
to decide no genuine issue of material fact existed upon 
this purported issue. 
3. Whether prior to the aforesaid date the 
Defendants, or any of them, were associated to-
gether as a joint venture or partnership. [Plain-
tiff's brief, page 14] 
This issue is simply a restatement of "issue" No. 2. 
Plaintiff's entire argument and attempt to make a material 
issue appear here is again based in its entirety upon a dba 
which was mistakenly filed by one of the corporate trustees 
in the capacity of trustee after the Articles of Incorporati 
of The Exchange Place Social Association stating clearly The 
Exchange was a dba of that corporation. The same argument 
and facts as have been presented above (including the im-
possibility of reliance upon the same by Plaintiff in any 
way, shape or form) apply here to clearly show no material 
fact or issue exists on this point. The lower court so 
found and correctly ruled accordingly. 
4. Also at issue is the question of the 
relationship between the Defendants prior to 
The Exchange Place Social Association, at which 
time Plaintiff had already commenced work to 
improve the leasehold. [Plaintiff's brief, 
page 14] 
-14-
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Plaintiff states in its brief, to support its conten-
tion that some issue exists here, that: 
Nowhere in the record is it denied that 
the Defendants, nor any of them, had a 
leasehold interest in the real property 
commonly known as 39 Exchange Place. 
[Plaintiff's brief, page 14] 
This is simply not true. Not only does the affidavit of 
Defendants (R. 4-6) clearly by implication do so, but this 
fact was specifically and directly denied at the hearing, 
including the exhibition of certain leases and subleases 
showing the premises and all interests therein to be at all 
times relevant herein exclusively in the Salt Lake Stock 
Exchange, Investestate, or The Exchange. These leases 
together with argument made at the hearing showed that there 
was never any interest held by the individual defendants in 
the said premises at anytime. This was in fact the entire 
reason for the Stipulation allowing Plaintiff to refile 
within ten days against the proper defendant, The Exchange 
Place Social Association, and the sole reason for the waiver 
by said corporation of the statute of limitations provided 
by Section 14-2-1, Utah Code Ann. (1953). 
After setting out the above four purported issues 
(which are in fact not issues at all) Plaintiff next in its 
brief states: 
In light of these numerous material facts 
that are genuinely at issue, in order for 
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the trial court to have granted summary 
judgment, it must have determined these 
facts in Defendants1 favor. This it can-
not do! [Plaintiff's brief, page 15] 
This is again another "bootstrap" operation designed by 
Plaintiff to lead the Court down the garden path to Plain-
tiff's next statement (a quote from Hill v. Grand Central Inc., 
25 U.2d 121, 477 P.2d 150, 151 (1970)), that: 
Summary judgment is never used to deter-
mine what the facts are, but only to 
ascertain whether there are any material 
issues in dispute. If there be any such 
disputed issues of fact, they cannot be 
resolved by summary judgment. . . [Plain-
tiff 's brief, page 15] 
This is referred to as a "bootstrap" operation because 
Plaintiff has assumed the very question at issue, i.e., 
whether there are in fact any material facts generally at 
issue. Defendants assert that the pleadings, evidence and 
argument below, all clearly admissible and properly con-
sidered by Judge Hanson (as correctly pointed out by Plain-
tiff in its brief and by Rule 12(b)(6) and Rule 56 cited 
therein) were, when viewed together, so clear as to compel 
the lower court to find that no material question genuinely 
existed as to whether these Defendants were doing business 
in their individual capacity. That is, the evidence was so 
clear that the Court, being fully advised and upon the 
entire record, argument and evidence before it, ascertained 
that there were no material issues of fact at dispute. 
-16-
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Plaintiff's position in its brief appears to be simply 
that in order for there to exist "a material fact" which is 
"genuinely at issue" counsel need only submit one affidavit 
or stand up at a hearing and make one statement which dis-
agrees with another affidavit or statement of the opposing 
party. This is simply not the case even as is made clear by 
all of the authorities cited by Plaintiff itself in its 
brief. 
Rule 12(b) states in part (cited at Page 11 of Plain-
tiff's brief): 
. . . The motion shall be treated as 
one for summary judgment and disposed 
of as provided in Rule 56, and all par-
ties shall be given reasonable opportun-
ity to present all material made per-
tinent to such motion by Rule 56. 
[Emphasis added] 
It is clear under the rule that the lower court properly 
admitted and considered all evidence in its determination. 
Rule 56 then (again as stated by Plaintiff in its brief at 
page 12) provides that: 
The judgment sought shall be rendered 
forthwith if [all of the evidence pre-
sented to the court] show that there is 
no genuine issue as to any material fact 
and that the moving party is entitled to 
a judgment as a matter of law. 
The lower court did have a duty to examine the entire 
evidence and, upon that evidence, to "ascertain whether 
there are any material issues of fact in dispute." (Hill v. Grand 
-17-
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Central Inc., supra.) This is exactly what the lower court 
did and it determined that no such material facts genuinely 
existed. • ;; . -v.-; 
The lower court and only the lower court had the 
opportunity to examine and be fully advised upon the entire 
evidence, exhibits and argument of counsel for both sides. 
It is for this reason that the Utah Supreme Court has un-
ceasingly been committed to the basic principle that, 
. . . reviewing courts will not inter-
fere with the exercise of the trial court's 
discretion in the matter, unless it appears 
that a manifest injustice has been done, 
or the decision cannot reasonably be 
found to be supported by the evidence. 
[Emphasis added] Papanikolas Bros. 
Enterprises v. Sugar House Shopping 
Center Associates, et al., supra. 
Our case goes even further. Plaintiff, pursuant to its 
request, was given a rehearing on this question by the lower 
court. At the second hearing, held on this issue on February 
11, Judge Hanson again gave both sides another opportunity 
to fully argue the question and to present any additional 
evidence or exhibits. In their motion and at that hearing, 
Plaintiff's counsel in fact specifically argued to the court 
the same arguments presented in Plaintiff'$ brief that there 
existed material facts. (R. 16-15) At the conclusion of 
that hearing, Judge Hanson disagreed and he again reaffirmed 
his ruling that the evidence was clear and that no material 
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facts genuinely existed and that the three Defendants named 
were not acting as individuals and were clearly not proper 
defendants. 
Defendants respectfully request this court to affirm 
the lower court's well informed and proper decision upon 
this matter. 
POINT II 
IN THE EVENT THIS COURT RULES IN FAVOR OF 
PLAINTIFF, ANY AWARD OF COSTS SHOULD BE STAYED, 
THE SAME BEING AWARDED TO THAT PARTY WHICH UL-
TIMATELY PREVAILS AT THE CONCLUSION OF THIS 
MATTER. 
This court clearly has equitable powers in deciding 
upon the most proper and equitable method for the awarding 
of costs upon an appeal such as this. Should Defendants 
prevail, as we believe to be the proper result, these De-
fendants will be dismissed from the lawsuit entirely and 
should, therefore, receive their costs. 
In the alternative, however, should Plaintiff prevail 
upon this appeal the effect will be to continue the lawsuit 
in the lower court against these Defendants toward a deter-
mination upon the merits. In such a case, it is certainly 
foreseeable that these Defendants may win on the merits 
after a trial indicating that Plaintiff never in fact had 
any cause of action whatsoever. Indeed, Defendants submit 
that, should Plaintiff win here, it will nevertheless lose 
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in the resulting trial below. 
Should Defendants lose on this appeal but be ultimately 
successful below, it would clearly be inequitable to order 
that they pay Plaintiff's costs in appealing a single issue 
in a lawsuit where it is ultimately determined Plaintiff has 
no cause of action. 
For these reasons, Defendants request the Court to 
award them costs in affirming the lower court's decision. 
In the alternative, should this court find in favor of 
Plaintiff on this issue, Defendants request that any award 
of costs be stayed, the same to be awarded to whichever 
party prevails on the merits below. 
CONCLUSION 
The lower court twice had the opportunity for a full 
and complete hearing upon the single question at issue in 
this appeal. After being fully advised upon the pleadings, 
evidence, exhibits and argument by counsel for both sides, 
the lower court determined that the three named Defendants 
were not doing business as The Exchange nor were they acting 
in any individual capacity at any time or for any purposes 
relevant to Plaintiff's Complaint. The lower court found 
the evidence to be so clear as to indicate that no material 
facts were genuinely at issue on this question and the court 
properly dismissed Plaintiffs Complaint accordingly with 
-20-
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
leave to refile against the proper Defendants. 
This court has long subscribed to the position that it 
will not interfere with the conclusion of the trial court in 
making such a ruling unless the decision cannot reasonably 
be found to be supported by the evidence. The lower court's 
decision in this case was amply if not overwhelmingly sup-
ported by the admissible evidence before the court and, as 
such, may not properly be overturned on appeal. 
Defendants respectfully request this court to affirm 
the lower court's ruling dismissing Plaintiff's Complaint 
and to award Defendants their costs. 
Respectfully submitted, 
ADAMS, KASTING & ANDERSON 
*rneys for Defendants-
spondents 
200, The Glass Factory 
Arrow Press Square 
Salt Lake City, UT 84101 
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